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This paper aims to analyze the derivatives disclosure in banks’ 
annual risk reports. In this paper, the author uses content analysis 
to examine the qualitative and quantitative profiles of the 
derivatives disclosure at a cross-country level, with particular 
reference to credit derivatives. The empirical research is conducted 
on a sample of large European banks. The paper also shows that 
there is room to improve various aspects of derivatives disclosure, 
and provides some useful insights for further research. The 
derivatives disclosure in banks’ annual risk reports has deep 
managerial, financial, regulatory and accounting implications at a 
firm and industry levels, and the comprehension of the rational 
underlying it is critical to maintaining competitive advantages in the 
banking industry and informational and allocative efficiency in the 
financial markets. Although the existence of substantial research on 
credit derivatives and financial statements in the literature, none 
have directly focused on credit derivatives disclosure at a cross-
country level applying the content analysis based on an objective 
evaluation approach. It leaves a gap that the paper aims to 
overcome. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Risk disclosure, and credit derivatives disclosure 
particularly, is a pivotal topic in banking. The 
attention on banking risks and risk reporting has 
improved enormously in the last times due to the 
turmoil in the financial systems, the growing 
regulatory and accounting requirements in the 
banking industry, and the growing complexity of 
banking activity, especially large and multi-business 
banks.  
In this paper we make an empirical analysis of 
credit derivatives disclosure with reference to four 
largest European banks, using the content analysis 
as a research method. The paper shows that 
different aspects of derivative disclosure can be 
improved, discusses some policy and theoretical 
implications, and provides some useful suggestions 
for further research. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
analyses the methodology that has been used to 
conduct empirical research on risk disclosure. 
Section 4 introduces credit derivatives and bank risk 
management. It aims to highlight the nature and 
functions of credit derivatives and provide a risk 
management perspective. Section 5 provides an 
accounting perspective on credit derivatives in 
banking. Section 6 analyses the research design of 
the empirical study. Section 7 analyses and 
compares the results of the empirical research. 
Section 8 discusses the research findings. Section 9 
provides some proposals for a better credit 
derivative disclosure in banking and for future 
research. Section 10 concludes.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The derivative disclosure is essential for banks’ 
stakeholders to assess the bank’s risk exposures and 
to make decisions. It is necessary that an adequate 
disclosure on banks’ credit derivative exposures 
does not stay within the boundaries of a bank, but it 
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should be provided to all stakeholders. Risk 
disclosure contributes to reducing asymmetric 
information (Akerlof, 1970; Leland & Pyle, 1977). 
Disclosing information about banking risks and their 
derivative portfolios will result in a reduction of the 
information asymmetry and agency problems (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) among 
stakeholders in banking. Bank managers have more 
information about risks that might affect future 
results than other stakeholders.  From this view, risk 
disclosure can be intended as an incentive device 
(Armstrong et al., 2010; Dobler, 2008) to make a 
level with different stakeholders’ interests and to 
better perform the functions of screening, selection, 
and monitoring (Diamond, 1984). Risk disclosure 
acts also as a signal of the soundness and stability 
of a bank; it performs a signaling mechanism for the 
market (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977). By 
disclosing more information about risks, 
shareholders and other stakeholders are able to 
correctly appreciate the bank’s performances and 
market value (Belcredi, 1993; Linsley & Shrives, 
2005; Linsley et al., 2006). Risk transparency allows 
users to make more informed decisions on banks’ 
performances and strategies. Disclosing information 
about banking risks will give the opportunity to 
maximize shareholders’ value (Carey & Stulz, 2007). 
Consequently, a risk disclosure threshold has to be 
established by accounting standard setters and 
banking regulators, otherwise, the efficacy of risk 
disclosure would be affected by a “firm-specific” 
principal-agent problem.  
In the last decades, many studies have 
examined bank disclosure from different points of 
view, mainly accounting and financial markets 
efficiency perspectives. Recent studies have 
analyzed specifically risk reporting in bank’s annual 
reports (Ahmed et al., 2006; Ammon, 1996; 
Chalmers & Godfrey, 2000; Gaetano, 1996; 
Malinconico, 2007) by using content analysis 
(Abraham and Cox, 2007; Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2004; Bernini et al., 2011; Bryan 1997; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2005; Linsley et al., 2006; Neri, 
2011; Scannella, 2018; Scannella and Polizzi, 2018; 
Woods & Marginson, 2004). In this perspective, risk 
disclosures and banking risks have to be analyzed 
using a holistic approach (Tutino, 2013; Tutino et al., 
2011).   
Although the existence of a large quantity of 
research on credit derivatives and financial 
statements in the banking literature, none have 
directly focused on credit derivative disclosure at a 
cross-country level, with homogeneous banking 
regulations, applying the content analysis based on 
an objective evaluation approach. This paper 
provides insights to overcome the gap in the 
literature. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In this paper, the content analysis is used to 
measure the quality and quantity of credit derivative 
disclosure in banking. 
The content analysis, as a “research technique 
for making replicable and valid inferences from 
texts to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 
2004), and as “a research technique for the 
objective, systematic and quantitative description of 
the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 
1952), is the methodology that has been mostly used 
by many researchers to examine and evaluate risk 
reporting in annual reports. Over the years, content 
analysis has been widely used in many research 
areas (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990). The content 
analysis enables researchers to investigate, evaluate, 
systematize, and categorize a large amount of 
textual information, such as the information that is 
published in banks’ risk reporting. The aim of the 
content analysis is to organize and elicit meaning 
from collected data. Consequently, we argue the 
appropriateness of the use of content analysis for 
conducting empirical research on risk disclosure.  
By using a scoring model based on key 
disclosure parameters, this paper shows evidence 
that banks provide different credit derivative risk 
reporting, even though they are compliant to a 
harmonized regulatory and accounting framework.  
Although the topic of risk disclosure has 
increased in the last years, there are not so many 
empirical researches that examine cross-country and 
industry-specific factors. In this empirical research, 
we employ a content analysis methodology than 
aims to evaluate the quality and quantity of credit 
derivative disclosure in banking. 
 
4. CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
IN BANKING 
 
Credit derivatives are credit risk transferring 
instruments. They are used by banks and other 
financial institutions (mainly insurance companies) 
for credit risk management purposes, as they 
provide an effective means to hedge and trade credit 
risk. Credit derivatives separate the credit risk 
trading from asset trading. 
Credit derivatives are over-the-counter financial 
instruments, exchanged on a bilateral transaction 
scheme where two parties (protection buyer and 
protection seller) decide to trade credit risk arising 
from a specific asset, usually called “reference 
obligation” (Chance & Brooks, 2012; Chaplin, 2010; 
Choudhry, 2013; Das, 2005; Tavakoli, 1998).  
Credit derivatives offer a flexible approach to 
conduct credit risk management in banking since 
they can be tailored to reflect the specific 
characteristics of credit risk exposures, and credit 
risk management purposes (Dunbar, 2011; Mengle, 
2007; Murphy, 2013; Steinherr, 2000). Hedging 
continues to be the predominant reason for the use 
of derivatives. Speculation is the second reason 
behind the widespread of credit derivatives in 
financial markets. Speculators use derivatives not to 
reduce financial risk but to potentially profit from it. 
They gain exposures to credit risk without the need 
to purchase the underlining asset. At the same time, 
they provide liquidity that makes risk hedging 
achievable (Drago, 1998). Another important reason 
for the use of derivatives is the arbitrage (McDonald, 
2013).  
A critical aspect that makes the credit 
derivatives instruments very attractive to banks is 
that credit risk might have a huge impact on bank 
performance (Bomfim, 2005; Culp, 2004; Nelken, 
1999; Onado, 2004, 2018). Banks are exposed to 
credit risk since their core business is lending, 
mainly in the commercial banking business, and 
investing in bonds issued by firms, mainly in the 
investment banking business. Credit risk is a serious 
threat for banks and even more for the stability of 
the financial industry since the interconnections 
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among financial institutions provide a contagion 
mechanism by which financial crises spread, as 
reflected by the systemic risk (Acharya & 
Richardson, 2009; Hull, 2018). 
Credit risk transfer provides many advantages 
to banks. It reduces the regulatory capital 
requirements on credit exposures. Consequently, it 
will free bank capital that could be used to make 
more loans. At the same time, the bank keeps 
maintaining the relationships with borrowers. 
Another important aspect that makes the credit 
derivatives attractive is that they allow banks to 
diversify their credit portfolios, especially for small 
and medium banks, without negotiating the asset 
itself (Drago, 2014; Scannella, 2013).  
The credit risk transfer has microeconomic and 
macroeconomic implications. Since credit derivatives 
instruments allow the credit risk transfer and the 
overall reduction of credit risk exposure, banks may 
attenuate the lending standards and the monitoring 
of credit exposures subject to risk transfer. In this 
perspective, a bank has fewer incentives to control 
and monitor borrowers.  
Therefore, bank lending can increasingly be 
characterized by a decreasing level of accuracy 
towards the creditworthiness of the borrower, 
determining a potential increase in the overall level 
of credit risk in the financial industry. The high 
degree of interdependences among financial 
institutions may increase the systemic risk that 
follows the growth of credit derivatives (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005, 2008; 
Duffee & Zhou, 2001; Instefjord, 2003; International 
Monetary Fund, 2006). 
At the microeconomic level, we can observe 
that the expansion of the credit risk transfer market 
has contributed to the transformation of the 
traditional banking business model called “originate-
to-hold” into the new one called “originate-to-
distribute”. According to the first business model, a 
bank originates loans and holds them in their 
balance sheet until their maturity. Instead, in the 
originate-to-distribute business model, a bank does 
not provide all the functions of the previous model, 
but it specializes mainly in the origination and 
servicing activities. Consequently, the previous 
“relationship banking” approach is replaced by a 
“transactional banking” approach, in which banks do 
not have strong incentives to establish a long-term 
financial tie with borrowers (Baravelli, 2011; 
Mottura, 2011, 2016; Ruozi, 2015; Scannella, 2011).  
Credit derivatives were first introduced in 
1993, but they have experienced very rapid growth 
since then Basel Committee started in December 
2004 publishing data on credit derivatives market. 
At the end of 2016, the Bank for International 
Settlement (2016) estimated that the total notional 
principal underlying outstanding credit derivatives 
were close to $6 trillion. It was $57,894 trillion in 
2007. As a share of all OTC derivatives, credit 
derivatives fell from 10% to 2% (in terms of notional 
amounts) between end-June 2007 and end-June 
2016, and from 8% to 2% (in terms of gross market 
value).  
Briefly, credit derivatives are effective tools for 
credit risk management in banking. With credit 
derivatives, it is possible to isolate the credit risk 
from the risk/return profile of a financial asset. As 
an insurance instrument, credit derivatives allow 
banks to protect their credit exposures against 
borrowers’ defaults or other credit events. 
 
5. CREDIT DERIVATIVES IN BANKING: AN 
ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVE 
 
Accounting for credit derivatives is based on the 
accounting standards for derivatives and are 
covered by IAS 39 that establishes principles for 
recognizing and measuring financial assets, financial 
liabilities. IAS 39 has been removed by IFRS 9 in 
January 2018. 
At the time of initial recognition, all derivatives 
are measured at fair value. After the initial 
recognition, the fair value changes of derivatives are 
recognized in profit or loss of the bank’s balance 
sheet. Special hedge accounting requirements are 
provided for hedging instruments (Chalmers & 
Godfrey, 2000; Ramirez, 2015; Rutigliano, 2011, 
2016). Initially, the “fair value” was defined in IAS 39 
as the price for which an asset can be negotiated, or 
a liability settled, between knowledgeable parties in 
an arm’s length transaction. After that, IFRS 13 has 
revisited this definition. It describes the fair value on 
the basis of an “exit price” notion and uses a “fair 
value hierarchy”. IFRS 13 defines fair value as the 
price that can be obtained to sell an asset or to 
transfer a liability (“exit price”) in an orderly 
transaction between market participants. IFRS 13 
provides a three-level hierarchy of fair value 
measurements. IFRS 13 requires to use valuation 
methods that are appropriate with reference to 
available data.  
Derivatives are often measured by using market 
prices in an active market (fair value hierarchy: level 
1). When there are not any available market prices, 
its fair value is calculated using appropriate 
evaluation methods: if inputs are observable we have 
the level 2 fair value hierarchy. On the contrary, if 
inputs are unobservable we have the level 3 fair 
value hierarchy. Over-the-counter derivatives are 
usually evaluated by using measurement 
methodologies because there are not any discernable 
market prices.  
As we have seen above, the use of derivative 
instruments is widespread among financial 
institutions. This increases the importance of an 
accurate credit derivative disclosure in banking, 
particularly with respect to the ongoing turmoil in 
world financial systems. An appropriate evaluation 
of a bank’s risk exposures is possible if a bank 
discloses information not only on its accounting 
policies and practices where financial risks arise (i.e. 
investments, proprietary trading, lending, funding) 
but also on credit derivatives in banks’ portfolios 
(Bessis, 2015; Sironi & Resti, 2008). 
In 2002, the European Union started a process 
of accounting harmonization with the aim to adopt a 
common accounting language. This process began 
with the adoption by the European Parliament and 
the Council of the Regulation n. 1606/2002 of 19 
July 2002 on the application of IAS standards in 
order to harmonize and compare the financial 
information provided by European banks in their 
financial statements, both across time and space 
(Bisoni et al., 2012; Tutino, 2009, 2015). Since 
January 2006, European financial institutions have 
been disclosing information on risk exposures and 
derivatives accordingly to International Accounting 
Standards.  
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With the directive 2001/65 the European 
Parliament and of the Council have recommended a 
fair value accounting scheme for the evaluation of 
most financial instruments, including derivatives, 
for the annual and consolidated statements of banks 
and other financial institutions.  
More risk reporting requirements are proposed 
by Basel II. This bank capital adequacy framework 
consists of three pillars. For the purpose of this 
research, Pillar 3 is the most important one, because 
it aims to promote an effective market discipline 
mechanism of the financial markets that is mainly 
based on disclosure frameworks. Pillar 3 requires 
quantitative and qualitative information to be 
disclosed for each type of banking risk. 
It is essential to notice that both Basel II and 
International Accounting standards require risks to 
be disclosed “through the eyes of management” and 
to be “consistent with the approaches and 
methodologies that the directors use to assess and 
manage the bank’s risk” (Linsley & Shrives, 2005). 
In this section, we briefly analyzed the most 
important regulation and accounting standards that 
represent the regulatory and accounting framework 
of derivatives disclosure in banking. This will help 
discern between obligatory and voluntary disclosure 
in banking, and it sets the background behind the 
bank’s disclosure strategies and practices. Next 
section depicts the research design of the empirical 
investigation.  
 
6. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
DISCLOSURE IN BANKING: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the 
differences among banks with reference to credit 
derivative disclosure in annual reporting. In order to 
do this research, we have analyzed the information 
on credit derivatives in the 2015’s Annual 
statements and Pillar 3 reports of four large 
European banks. This is a cross-country research 
established on one-year risk reporting. It is not 
historical analysis. We decided to investigate 2015 
because it is a sort of “timeline” in derivative 
disclosure in banking.  
The banks considered in this empirical research 
are the largest ones in Europe, one for each country, 
ranked by market capitalization: BNP Paribas, Banco 
Santander, Intesa Sanpaolo, and Deutsche Bank 
(Table 1). These banks have some characteristics in 
common that enhance the accuracy of the content 
analysis: they have a market capitalization greater 
than 20 billion euro; all of them are global and 
multi-business banks; each one is the most 
significant bank in its own country; their size calls 
for a “too big to fail” policy; with the exception of 
Intesa Sanpaolo, they are “global systemically 
important banks” (Financial Stability Board, 2015).  
 
Table 1.Sample 
 
Bank Country 
Market сapitalization 
(2016) 
(data in billions of euro) 
BNP Paribas France 75,5 
Banco Santander Spain 73,6 
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy 40,5 
Deutsche Bank Germany 23,8 
 
 
In this paper, we propose a scoring model to 
evaluate credit derivative disclosure in banking. This 
model provides two disclosure ratios for each bank 
based on key disclosure parameters, that will be 
used to compare the quality of banks’ derivative 
disclosure:  
- the derivative transparency ratio (DTR): it 
gives an overview of the derivative 
disclosure in banking; 
- the credit derivative transparency ratio 
(CDTR): it focuses only on credit derivative 
information. 
In order to provide the first ratio (derivative 
transparency ratio) we have chosen 10 meaningful 
risk disclosure parameters as follows: reasons to 
hold derivative instruments; fair value hierarchy; 
valuation techniques, notional amount of derivatives 
disaggregated by use; fair value of derivatives 
disaggregated by use; notional amount of derivatives 
disaggregated by hedge accounting category; fair 
value of derivatives disaggregated by hedge 
accounting category; notional amount of derivatives 
by instrument type; fair value of derivatives by 
instrument type; maturity of derivative instruments. 
For each parameter, we have assigned “1” or “0” 
score: score “1” means that a bank discloses the 
piece of information; score “0” means that a bank 
does not disclose the piece of information, and the 
bank fails to provide any information required. The 
transparency of derivative information is calculated 
by dividing the total score for each bank by the 
maximum score. The derivative transparency ratio 
(DTR) is equal to “bank’s score/bank’s total 
maximum score”. 
In order to provide the second ratio (credit 
derivative transparency ratio) we have chosen 4 
meaningful risk disclosure parameters as follows: 
credit derivatives by protection and portfolio type; 
credit risk mitigation techniques; fair value of credit 
derivatives; notional amount of credit derivatives. 
For each parameter, we have assigned “1” or “0” 
score: score “1” means that a bank discloses the 
piece of information; score “0” means that a bank 
does not disclose the piece of information, and the 
bank fails to provide any information required. The 
transparency of credit derivative information is 
calculated by dividing the total score for each bank 
by the maximum score. The credit derivative 
transparency ratio (CDTR) is equal to “bank’s 
score/bank’s total maximum score”. 
By reading the 2015 annual reports, qualitative 
and quantitative data on derivative disclosure are 
collected and analyzed through the application of 
content analysis on the published disclosure 
statements (Annual statements and Pillar 3 reports). 
This analysis is not based on software. In the 
disclosure indices, each of the 14 key parameters is 
treated equally. The most important characteristic of 
this content analysis is the absence of any subjective 
evaluation. The final result of the scoring model 
includes qualitative and quantitative key 
information that is analyzed using an objective 
evaluation approach. So, it means that the disclosure 
indices do not involve any subjective judgment. The 
disclosure indices detect differences in transparency 
across banks. 
The content analysis we propose in this paper 
provides a scoring model based on a binary 
evaluation scheme (“0” or “1” score) to evaluate the 
risk reporting. This is the most important aspect of 
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the methodology. Furthermore, it is not based on 
users perspectives. Consequently, it cannot evaluate 
the usefulness of risk disclosure and the level of 
satisfaction of users of the bank’s risk disclosure. 
Specifically, it leaves unanswered the question of 
whether risk disclosure in banking adds “pages” to 
annual reports rather than increases transparency. 
More disclosure does not necessarily imply an 
increase of transparency. It is crucial to differentiate 
between disclosure and transparency (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2008; Freixas and Laux, 2012). The next 
section will discuss the empirical research results 
more in depth. 
 
7. RESULTS 
 
In this section, we discuss the results of the 
empirical research we have conducted on the 
following banks: BNP Paribas, Banco Santander, 
Intesa Sanpaolo, and Deutsche Bank.  
 
7.1. BNP Paribas: derivative transparency ratio 
 
BNP Paribas provides information about: fair value 
hierarchy; valuation technique, notional amount of 
derivatives disaggregated by use; fair value of 
derivatives disaggregated by use; fair value of 
derivatives disaggregated by hedge accounting 
category; fair value of derivatives by instrument 
type; date of maturity of derivative instruments.  
BNP Paribas provides details about the fair 
value hierarchy in the section “Instrument classes 
and classification within the fair value hierarchy for 
assets and liabilities measured at fair value” of the 
Notes for the year 2015. Assets and liabilities are 
categorized into the fair value hierarchy: 
- level 1: fair values are determined using 
market prices in active markets. Level 1 
positions include all derivatives that are 
listed on exchanges markets or other active 
markets; 
- level 2: crucial inputs of evaluation methods 
are observable market data, either directly 
or indirectly. Level 2 positions include 
instruments such as credit default swaps, 
equity/foreign exchange (FX)/commodities 
forwards and options, interest rate swaps, 
caps, floors and swaptions, structured 
derivatives such as exotic options, mono- 
and multi-underlying equity/funds 
derivatives; 
- level 3: the evaluation of the fair value is 
based on crucial inputs that are 
unobservable in the secondary market of 
financial instruments. Complex derivatives 
in level 3 class include hybrid instruments, 
credit correlation instruments, stock basket 
optional instruments. 
With reference to the valuation techniques, the 
main ones used by BNP Paribas to calculate the fair 
value of the derivative instruments are the following: 
a) interest rate derivatives: prepayment 
modelling, discounted cash flows, hybrid 
forex interest rate option pricing model, 
inflation pricing model, interest rates option 
pricing model; 
b) credit derivatives: recovery modelling and 
base correlation projection methods, credit 
default model, stripping, extrapolation and 
interpolation; 
c) equity derivatives: several volatility option 
models. 
A score 0 is assigned to the parameter “reasons 
to hold derivative instruments” because  BNP Paribas 
does not disclose any information.  
BNP Paribas provides a disaggregation of 
derivatives by use and their fair value: derivatives 
held for hedging and derivatives held for trading 
purposes. Interest rate derivatives are mainly used 
for hedging purposes. It also discloses information 
on the fair value of derivatives disaggregated by 
hedge accounting category in the note 5.b of the 
2015 Annual Report, and the fair value of derivatives 
by instrument type. BNP Paribas failed to provide the 
notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by 
hedge accounting category and the notional amount 
of derivatives by instrument type, thus a score of 0 
is assigned to these items. BNP Paribas discloses 
information as regards the fair value of derivative 
contracts by maturity in section “Contractual 
maturities of the balance sheet”. Derivative financial 
instruments are included in the “not determined” 
maturity section. Briefly, the BNP Paribas’ derivative 
transparency ratio (DTR) is equal to 0,7 (total 
score/bank’s total maximum score = 7/10). 
 
Table 2. BNP Paribas: Derivative transparency ratio 
 
Risk disclosure parameters Score 
Reasons to hold derivative instruments 0 
Fair value hierarchy 1 
Valuation techniques 1 
Notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by 
use 
1 
Fair value of derivatives disaggregated by use 1 
Notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by 
hedge accounting category 
0 
Fair value of derivatives disaggregated by hedge 
accounting category 
1 
Notional amount of derivatives by instrument type 0 
Fair value of derivatives by instrument type 1 
Maturity of derivative instruments 1 
Total score 7 
Sources: BNP Paribas, Annual statement and Pillar III 
report, 2015. 
 
7.2. BNP Paribas: Credit derivative transparency 
ratio 
 
BNP Paribas does not provide any information about 
the protection and portfolio type of credit 
derivatives, thus a score 0 is assigned to this item. 
BNP Paribas uses netting agreements in order to 
reduce credit risk that is related to derivative 
trading. The Fédération Bancaire Française (FBF) and 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) provide the most used agreement 
frameworks. It also discloses information about the 
notional amount and the fair value of credit 
derivatives. Briefly, the BNP Paribas’ credit derivative 
transparency ratio (CDTR) is equal to 0,75 (total 
score/bank’s total maximum score = 3/4). 
 
Table 3. BNP Paribas:  
Credit derivative transparency ratio 
 
Risk disclosure parameters Score 
Credit derivatives by protection and portfolio type 0 
Credit risk mitigation techniques 1 
Fair value of credit derivatives 1 
Notional amount of credit derivatives 1 
Total score 3 
Sources: BNP Paribas, Annual statement and Pillar III 
report, 2015. 
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7.3. Banco Santander: Derivative transparency ratio 
 
Banco Santander provides complete information 
about the reasons to hold derivative instruments; 
fair value hierarchy; valuation techniques; notional 
amount of derivatives disaggregated by use; fair 
value of derivatives disaggregated by use; aggregate 
notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by 
hedge accounting category; fair value of derivatives 
disaggregated by hedge accounting category; 
notional amount of derivatives by instrument type; 
fair value of derivatives by instrument type. 
Banco Santander negotiates derivatives for the 
following reasons: management of customers’ 
exposures to market and credit risks; management 
of own risk exposures (hedging derivatives); trading 
derivatives. 
Banco Santander provides details about the fair 
value hierarchy in the section “Valuation technique” 
of the Notes for the year 2015. The hierarchy 
establishes three categories for valuing financial 
instruments: 
- level 1: quoted prices in active financial 
markets. Level 1 positions include, 
exchange-traded derivatives, government 
debt securities, equity securities and short 
positions in securities; 
- level 2: observable market data are available 
for internal models. Level 2 positions 
include loans and advances to banks, loans 
and advances to customers, equity and 
credit derivatives, debt securities, equity 
securities, exchange rate derivatives, 
interest rate derivatives, deposits by banks; 
- level 3: observable market data are not 
available for internal models. Level 3 
positions include exchange rate derivatives, 
loans and advances to customers, equity 
and credit derivatives, equity securities and 
debt securities in issue debt securities. 
Banco Santander uses several types of 
derivatives, including both exchange-traded and 
over-the-counter (OTC) instruments. Most of the 
derivatives are traded in the OTC market and are 
classified within level 2 in the fair value hierarchy. 
These consist of swaps, index and securities options, 
exchange rate options, interest rate futures, interest 
rate options. The value of level 3 derivatives is based 
on unobservable inputs or are traded less actively or 
traded in less-developed markets, such as some 
cross-currency swaps, credit default swaps and 
options.  
The main techniques used by Banco Santander 
to calculate the fair value of derivatives are the 
following: 
- swaps and interest rate futures: present 
value method; 
- exchange rate options, index and 
securities options: Black-Scholes Model; 
- interest rate options: Black-Scholes Model 
and Heath-Jarrow-Morton Model; 
- other derivatives: Monte Carlo valuation 
model. 
Banco Santander provides a disaggregation of 
derivatives by use: derivatives held for hedging and 
derivatives held for trading purposes. Banco 
Santander discloses, also, the notional amount and 
the fair value of derivatives disaggregated by hedge 
accounting category and instrument type in the 
2015’s Annual Report. Interest rate swaps are mainly 
used for hedging purposes. The maturity of 
derivative instruments is not specified by Banco 
Santander Group, thus a score 0 is assigned to this 
item. Briefly, Banco Santander’s derivative 
transparency ratio (DTR) is equal to 0,9 (total 
score/bank’s total maximum score = 9/10). 
 
Table 4. Banco Santander:  
Derivative transparency ratio 
 
Risk disclosure parameters Score 
Reasons to hold derivative instruments 1 
Fair value hierarchy 1 
Valuation techniques 1 
Notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by 
use 
1 
Fair value of derivatives disaggregated by use 1 
Notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by 
hedge accounting category 
1 
Fair value of derivatives disaggregated by hedge 
accounting category 
1 
Notional amount of derivatives by instrument type 1 
Fair value of derivatives by instrument type 1 
Maturity of derivative instruments 0 
Total score 9 
Sources: Banco Santander, Annual statement and Pillar III 
report, 2015. 
7.4. Banco Santander:  
Credit derivative transparency ratio 
 
Banco Santander’s Pillar 3 report (at page 151) 
provides statistics about the amount (in thousands 
of euros) of credit derivatives, divided between 
bought and sold protection and by portfolio type 
(regulatory banking book and regulatory trading 
book). 
Banco Santander employs many methods to 
mitigate and reduce credit risk exposures in 
derivative trading by entering into framework 
agreements for the netting-off of asset positions 
(such as ISDA Master Agreements) and the provision 
of collateral for non-payment. Banco Santander also 
discloses information as regards the notional 
amount and the fair value of credit derivatives. 
Briefly, Banco Santander’s credit derivative 
transparency ratio (CDTR) is equal to 1 (total 
score/bank’s total maximum score = 4/4). 
 
Table 5. Banco Santander: credit derivative 
transparency ratio 
 
Risk disclosure parameters Score 
Credit derivatives by protection and portfolio type 1 
Credit risk mitigation techniques 1 
Fair value of credit derivatives 1 
Notional amount of credit derivatives 1 
Total score 4 
Sources: Banco Santander, Annual statement and Pillar III 
report, 2015. 
 
7.5. Intesa Sanpaolo: Derivative transparency ratio 
 
Intesa Sanpaolo provides complete information 
about fair value hierarchy; valuation techniques, the 
notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by use; 
fair value of derivatives disaggregated by use; the 
aggregate notional amount of derivatives 
disaggregated by hedge accounting category; fair 
value of derivatives disaggregated by hedge 
accounting category. 
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Intesa Sanpaolo provides details about the “fair 
value hierarchy” in Part A.2 “Information on Fair 
Value” of the Notes for the year 2015. There are 
three different levels: 
- level 1: contributed equities and bonds, 
spot exchange rates, and derivatives for 
which quotations are available on an 
active market; 
- level 2: bonds that do not have an official 
price in an active market, derivatives 
measured through specific models, whose 
parameters are a quote in the market; 
- level 3: internal models based on 
unobservable market data.  
The main techniques used by Intesa Sanpaolo to 
calculate the fair value of derivatives are the 
following: 
 interest rate derivatives: net present value, 
Libor Market Model, Bivariate lognormal, 
etc. 
 foreign exchange rate derivatives: net 
present value FX, Garman-Kohlhagen, 
Lognormal with Uncertain Volatility, 
Stochastic Local Volatility; 
 equity derivatives: Net present Value, 
Generalised Black-Scholes, Heston, Jump 
Diffusion; 
 commodity derivatives: net present value, 
Generalised Black-Scholes, Independent 
Forward. 
Intesa Sanpaolo provides a disaggregation of 
derivatives by use: derivatives held for hedging and 
derivatives held for trading purposes. It also 
discloses the notional amount and the fair value of 
derivatives disaggregated by hedge accounting 
category in section 8 of the 2015’s Annual Report.  
Intesa Sanpaolo does not show any information 
on the notional amount and fair value of derivatives 
by instrument type, and the date of maturity of 
derivative instruments. Consequently, score 0 is 
assigned to these items. Briefly, Intesa Sanpaolo’s 
derivative transparency ratio (DTR) is equal to 0,6 
(total score/bank’s total maximum score = 6/10). 
 
Table 6. Intesa Sanpaolo: derivative transparency 
ratio 
Risk disclosure parameters Score 
Reasons to hold derivative instruments 0 
Fair value hierarchy 1 
Valuation techniques 1 
Notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by use 1 
Fair value of derivatives disaggregated by use 1 
Notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by 
hedge accounting category 
1 
Fair value of derivatives disaggregated by hedge 
accounting category 
1 
Notional amount of derivatives by instrument type 0 
Fair value of derivatives by instrument type 0 
Maturity of derivative instruments 0 
Total score 6 
Sources: Intesa Sanpaolo, Annual statement and Pillar III 
report, 2015. 
 
7.6. Intesa Sanpaolo: Credit derivative transparency 
ratio 
 
Intesa Sanpaolo’s Pillar 3 provides statistics about 
the notional amount (in millions of euros) of credit 
derivatives, divided between bought and sold 
protection and by portfolio type (regulatory banking 
book and regulatory trading book). 
Intesa Sanpaolo mitigates the exposure with 
reference to OTC derivatives, by using two 
techniques: bilateral netting agreements (by entering 
into ISDA agreements); collateral agreements to 
cover OTC derivatives transactions. 
Intesa Sanpaolo discloses information as 
regards the notional amount and the fair value of 
credit derivatives. Briefly, Intesa Sanpaolo’s credit 
derivative transparency ratio (CDTR) is equal to 1 
(total score/bank’s total maximum score = 4/4). 
 
Table 7. Intesa Sanpaolo:  
Credit derivative transparency ratio 
 
Risk disclosure parameters Score 
Credit derivatives by protection and portfolio type 1 
Credit risk mitigation techniques 1 
Fair value of credit derivatives 1 
Notional amount of credit derivatives 1 
Total score 4 
Sources: Intesa Sanpaolo, Annual statement and Pillar III 
report, 2015. 
7.7. Deutsche Bank: Derivative transparency ratio 
 
Deutsche Bank provides information about the 
reasons to use derivative instruments; fair value 
hierarchy; fair value of derivatives disaggregated by 
use; fair value of derivatives disaggregated by hedge 
accounting category; maturity of derivative 
instruments. 
Deutsche Bank holds derivatives for different 
reasons: to attenuate its market risks with reference 
to asset and liability management (hedging 
derivatives); to gain profits in derivatives markets 
(trading derivatives); to meet customers’ risk 
management needs. Deutsche Bank uses different 
types of derivatives. 
Deutsche Bank provides details about the fair 
value hierarchy in note 14 “Financial instruments 
carried at Fair value” to the consolidated financial 
statements for the year 2015. The financial 
instruments are classified into three levels of the 
fair value hierarchy: 
- level 1: it includes exchange-traded 
derivatives and equity securities traded on 
active markets, government bonds; 
- level 2: observable market data to evaluate 
financial instruments. In Level 2 there are 
many OTC derivatives and CDOs; 
- level 3: not directly observable market data 
to evaluate financial instruments. Level 3 
positions include complex OTC derivatives, 
highly-structured bonds, illiquid asset-
backed securities, distressed debt, illiquid 
CDO’s, some private equity placements, 
illiquid loans and some municipal bonds, 
many commercial real estate loans. 
Most of Deutsche Bank’s derivative positions 
are classified within Level 2 in the fair value 
hierarchy. As regards the valuation techniques, 
Deutsche Bank does not disclose the main 
techniques used for the product type, thus a score 0 
is assigned to this item. 
Deutsche Bank provides a disaggregation of 
derivatives by use: derivatives held for hedging and 
derivatives held for trading purposes. Deutsche Bank 
also discloses the fair value of derivatives 
disaggregated by hedge accounting category in note 
37 of the 2015’s Annual Report. 
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Deutsche Bank does not provide any 
information about the notional amount of 
derivatives disaggregated by use and hedge 
accounting category, the notional amount and the 
fair value of derivatives by instrument type, thus a 
score 0 is assigned to these items. On the contrary, 
Deutsche Bank discloses information as regards the 
fair value of derivative contracts by maturity in 
section “Maturity Analysis of Assets and Financial 
Liabilities”. Briefly, Deutsche Bank’s derivative 
transparency ratio (DTR) is equal to 0,5 (total 
score/bank’s total maximum score = 5/10). 
 
Table 8. Deutsche Bank: derivative transparency 
ratio 
 
Risk disclosure parameters Score 
Reasons to hold derivative instruments 1 
Fair value hierarchy 1 
Valuation techniques 0 
Notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by 
use 
0 
Fair value of derivatives disaggregated by use 1 
Notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by 
hedge accounting category 
0 
Fair value of derivatives disaggregated by hedge 
accounting category 
1 
Notional amount of derivatives by instrument type 0 
Fair value of derivatives by instrument type 0 
Maturity of derivative instruments 1 
Total score 5 
Source: Deutsche Bank, Annual statement and Pillar III 
report, 2015. 
 
7.8. Deutsche Bank: Credit derivative transparency 
ratio 
 
Deutsche Bank’s Pillar 3 Report (page 130) 
discloses the exposures of credit derivative 
transactions, used for hedging, divided between 
bought and sold protection and split into regulatory 
banking book (“used for own credit portfolio”) and 
regulatory trading book (“acting as intermediary”). 
Deutsche Bank employs mainly two credit risk 
mitigation techniques in order to reduce credit risk 
on derivative exposures: netting agreements (for 
exchange traded and OTC derivatives), and collateral 
arrangements. 
Deutsche Bank discloses information as regards 
the notional amount and the fair value of credit 
derivatives. Briefly, Deutsche Bank’s credit derivative 
transparency ratio (CDTR) is equal to 1 (total 
score/bank’s total maximum score = 4/4). 
 
Table 9. Deutsche Bank: credit derivative 
transparency ratio 
 
Risk disclosure parameters Score 
Credit derivatives by protection and portfolio type 1 
Credit risk mitigation techniques 1 
Fair value of credit derivatives 1 
Notional amount of credit derivatives 1 
Total score 4 
Source: Deutsche Bank, Annual statement and Pillar III 
report, 2015. 
 
7.9. Research findings: Summary  
 
This subsection briefly summarizes the research 
findings. Half of the banks in the sample disclose 
the reasons for the use of derivatives in their 2015’s 
Annual Reports. All banks provide information 
about the fair value hierarchy. Most banks (3 out of 
4) disclose information about the valuation 
techniques. 
All banks disclose the fair value of derivatives 
disaggregated by use and hedge accounting. Half of 
the sample provides information about the notional 
amount of derivatives disaggregated by use and 
hedge accounting, and the maturity of derivatives. 
Table 10 summarizes the total scores and the 
derivative transparency ratios of the four banks. 
 
Table 10. Derivative transparency ratios: a summary 
 
Risk disclosure parameters 
BNP 
Paribas 
Banco 
Santander 
Intesa 
Sanpaolo 
Deutsche 
Bank 
Reasons to hold derivative instruments 0 1 0 1 
Fair value hierarchy 1 1 1 1 
Valuation techniques 1 1 1 0 
Notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by use 1 1 1 0 
Fair value of derivatives disaggregated by use 1 1 1 1 
Notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by hedge accounting category 0 1 1 0 
Fair value of derivatives disaggregated by hedge accounting category 1 1 1 1 
Notional amount of derivatives by instrument type 0 1 0 0 
Fair value of derivatives by instrument type 1 1 0 0 
Maturity of derivative instruments 1 0 0 1 
Total score 7 9 6 5 
Derivative transparency ratio 0,7 0,9 0,6 0,5 
 
Banco Santander shows the highest “derivative 
transparency ratio”. This score means that disclosed 
derivative information is wide and easily accessible 
for all users. The bank should disclose information 
as regards the maturity date of derivatives to 
improve the level of transparency. 
BNP Paribas is the second bank ranked by 
“derivative transparency ratio”. The score of 0,7 
shows that BNP Paribas has room for the 
improvement of the derivative transparency. The 
disclosure could be improved by providing the 
notional amount of derivatives disaggregated by 
hedge accounting category and instrument type. 
Moreover, there is also room for the improvement of 
the explanations of the use of derivatives.  
Intesa Sanpaolo shows a “derivative 
transparency ratio” equal to 0,6. It means that there 
is room to increase its level of derivative 
transparency. The disclosure could be improved by 
providing more information about the notional 
amount and fair value of derivatives by instrument 
type, and their date of maturity. As for BNP Paribas, 
there is also room to improve the explanations of 
the use of derivatives. 
Deutsche Bank shows the lowest “derivative 
transparency ratio”. This score shows that Deutsche 
Risk Governance & Control: Financial Markets & Institutions / Volume 9, Issue 2, 2019 
42  
Bank can improve significantly the level of derivative 
disclosure. The disclosure could be improved by 
providing more information about the notional 
amount and fair value of derivatives, as well as the 
valuation techniques for derivatives. 
Table 11 summarizes the total scores and the 
credit derivative transparency ratios of the four 
banks. 
 
Table 11. Credit derivative transparency ratios: a summary 
 
Risk disclosure parameters BNP Paribas 
Banco 
Santander 
Intesa 
Sanpaolo 
Deutsche 
Bank 
Credit derivatives by protection and portfolio type 0 1 1 1 
Credit risk mitigation techniques 1 1 1 1 
Fair value of credit derivatives 1 1 1 1 
Notional amount of credit derivatives 1 1 1 1 
Total score 3 4 4 4 
Credit derivative transparency ratio 0,75 1 1 1 
 
Table 11 suggests that the level of transparency 
as regards credit derivatives is very high. Most of the 
banks in the sample (3 out of 4) disclose information 
about credit derivatives by protection and portfolio 
type, while all banks provide information about 
credit risk mitigation techniques, notional amount 
and fair value of credit derivatives. Banco Santander, 
Intesa Sanpaolo, and Deutsche Bank have a “credit 
derivative transparency ratio” equals to 1. This 
means that the credit derivatives disclosure is very 
high. BNP Paribas shows a lower ratio. It could 
improve its disclosure by providing information 
about the number of credit derivatives with 
reference to protection and portfolio type. 
Taking into account the fair value of derivatives 
and the total assets of the four banks in the sample 
(as stated in their annual reports), Deutsche Bank 
has the highest percentage of derivatives on total 
assets (more than 30%), while Intesa Sanpaolo has 
the lowest percentage of derivatives on total assets 
(5,6%). Banco Santander holds derivatives for 84,451 
million of euros (it is equal to 6,30% of the total 
assets), and BNP Paribas holds derivatives for 
354,687 million of euros, that represents the 17,78% 
of its total assets. 
 
8. DISCUSSION 
 
This empirical research has evaluated the quality of 
derivative disclosure in 2015’s annual statements 
and Pillar 3 reports of four European banks: BNP 
Paribas, Banco Santander, Intesa Sanpaolo, and 
Deutsche Bank. By reading the annual reports and 
using a scoring model based on key disclosure 
parameters, the paper finds that qualitative and 
quantitative risk information was disclosed by banks 
in different ways. Nevertheless, banks face a level 
playing field in terms of regulation and accounting 
standards. 
The research findings suggest that derivative 
disclosure can be improved. Given the large 
diffusion of derivatives in banking, it is evident the 
unavoidable need to improve disclosure practices by 
providing qualitative and quantitative information 
about their derivative activities, portfolios, policies, 
and strategies. Meaningful and accurate information 
provides an important basis for the decision making 
processes of banks’ stakeholders, investors’ 
understanding of risk exposure in banking, and the 
well-functioning of financial markets. To be able to 
correctly understand and appreciate the bank 
performance, investors need information to respect 
two critical dimensions of credit derivative 
disclosure: derivative use and hedging strategies. In 
this sense, the Notes to the account in the Annual 
Reports play a crucial role.  
Inadequate and incorrect derivative disclosure 
has many negative effects on investors, such as 
limited knowledge of derivative counterparties, and 
credit and liquidity risk, limited ability to evaluate 
the effectiveness of hedging, and underestimated 
risk exposure not reported on balance sheets. 
Consequently, derivative disclosure promotes a 
contraction of information asymmetry and agency 
problems. From this perspective outside 
stakeholders will have more information to take into 
account in their decision-making processes. 
Increased risk disclosure would help stakeholders in 
their investment decisions, although it is arduous to 
use the disclosure to verify a bank’s risk exposure or 
risk appetite (Woods & Marginson, 2004). In 
addition, the risk disclosure is also a way to reduce 
agency problems that arise from a divergence of 
interests between principals and agents (Fama, 1980; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 
1973), and to increase externalities in financial 
reporting (Foster, 1980).  
Risk disclosure, and derivative disclosure 
particularly, is also connected to the cost of capital 
of the bank. There is a connection between risk 
disclosure and the cost of capital. Risk disclosure 
might result in reduced costs of capital (Botosan, 
1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Healy & Palepu, 
2001; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000).  
Credit derivative disclosure plays a decisive 
role in order to promote trust in stakeholder 
relationships and market discipline, to attenuate the 
increase of the financial leverage and mitigate the 
adverse consequences for the financial system 
stability (Acharya & Richardson, 2009; Acharya & 
Ryan, 2016; Crockett, 2002; Nier & Baumann, 2006). 
A better knowledge of derivatives in banking could 
enhance both transparency and stability in the 
financial markets. 
This empirical investigation outlines some key 
characteristics of derivative reporting in banking. 
Risk disclosure is largely limited to compliance with 
legal requirements. Banks show remarkable 
differences in their reporting even though they 
adopt common accounting and regulatory standards. 
In this perspective, the adoption of standardized 
measures and reports can create the right conditions 
to achieve the objective. The harmonization has 
proved that the discretion left to the European 
member states in the creation of country-specific 
regulations allowed the presence of many 
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discrepancies between financial statements across 
European banks.  
Such differences in risk reporting can also be 
analyzed within the “signaling” approach (Leland & 
Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977) which proposes that banks 
might prefer to differentiate themselves from each 
other and that particularly those with good 
performances.  
Even if disclosure rules are homogeneous 
across European countries, there are important 
differences in the disclosure indices among banks in 
the sample. This evidence suggests that there is 
typically a voluntary element to risk disclosures. It 
might be the results of different information 
disclosure strategies. Banks develop and implement 
disclosure strategies that drive to a firm-specific 
combination of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
However, according to Lev (1992), not mandatory 
disclosure may change stakeholders’ expectations on 
bank market value. These findings are consistent 
with the view that firms provide voluntary 
disclosures for three main reasons: to reduce firm’s 
risk perception; to promote the reputation for 
transparency, and to address the shortages of 
mandatory reporting (Graham et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, the comprehensive maturity 
disclosure of derivative contracts (contractual and 
expected maturity), both assets and liabilities side, is 
important for stakeholders due to the poor 
reporting of the cash flow effects of derivatives, and 
the fact that a derivative asset can be transformed 
into a liability during the holding period. 
Despite the improved disclosure over the years, 
there still are important differences across large 
banks in Europe regarding the type, the features and 
usefulness of the information disclosed about their 
derivative strategies. 
 
9. PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER CREDIT DERIVATIVE 
DISCLOSURE IN BANKING 
 
This empirical research provides evidence that there 
is significant room for disclosure improvements in 
banking. The disclosure of the effects of hedging 
strategies on the bank’s performance, the 
effectiveness of hedging strategies and objectives, 
the costs of hedging, the risk management policies, 
should be enhanced. In particular, derivative and 
hedging disclosure could be better integrated with 
other risk disclosures in banking. Derivative 
disclosure and, in a wider perspective, risk 
disclosure in banking lacks a holistic view. The 
adoption of a holistic perspective will likely enhance 
the derivative disclosure on the interconnection of 
different risk factors. It also may help to better 
appreciate the effectiveness of risk management 
policies and strategies.  
The derivative disclosure lacks also of an 
adequate forward-looking perspective (e.g. scenario 
analyses and simulations, risk sensitivity analysis, 
expected and unexpected potential losses of 
derivatives exposures) that might stimulate the 
adoption of a longer-term instead of a short-term 
investment perspective. 
In order to appreciate the purpose of 
derivatives and hedging strategies in banking, the 
derivative disclosure should include details on the 
following aspects: underlying risk factors of 
derivative instruments; nature and purpose of 
embedded derivatives; distinction between hedging 
and trading derivatives; hedging strategies and 
techniques; profits and losses of derivative 
exposures; impacts of derivative exposures on 
bank’s cash flows and income; explanation of the 
methodologies that have been used by the bank to 
determine the fair value of derivatives. In particular, 
value at risk (VAR) can be an informative measure to 
predict the variability of trading revenues and 
compare the risk exposures of banks’ trading 
portfolios (Jorion, 2002). 
An element denoted in the course of the 
analysis regards the disclosure of the notional 
amount of derivatives. Each bank in the sample uses 
to disclose this kind of information. It is important 
to notice that the “notional amounts of derivatives” 
is not an appropriate piece of information to 
understand the bank’s risk exposure and derivative 
portfolios. In order to increase the usefulness of 
such information it should be disaggregated as 
follows: risk category (foreign currency, interest rate, 
commodity, and so on), nature (hedging or trading), 
accounting method (cash flow, fair value, net 
investment), long versus short exposures, type of 
instrument, and expected losses and gains. 
Finally, it is possible to state that the derivative 
disclosure in banking can be improved in the next 
future to better satisfy the growing demand of 
transparency that comes from investors and the 
growing accounting and regulatory constraints that 
come from national and international banking 
authorities and accounting standard setters. In brief, 
despite the progress observed in recent years, there 
is still an information gap between disclosure that 
users require for analytical purposes and the 
disclosure provided by banks. 
It is important to notice that the current 
International Accounting standards for derivatives 
(IAS 39) has been replaced in 2018 by the new IFRS 
9. It will stimulate future research in this field. 
Furthermore, the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements 
have been recently modified by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (2015, 2017). These will 
imply relevant qualitative and quantitative changes 
in banks’ annual derivative reports. 
 
10. CONCLUSION 
 
The use of derivatives is widespread across large 
banks, and they can be a significant source of 
systemic risk in the financial industry (Acharya & 
Richardson, 2009; Masera, 2009). The credit 
derivatives market has grown extraordinarily since 
1993, and the most important derivative instrument 
is the credit default swap. In addition, the use of 
derivatives in the banking industry has continued to 
raise after the burst of the financial crisis (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2016). 
Recent developments in the financial markets 
and regulatory frameworks at the European level put 
more emphasis on risk reporting in banking. The 
ongoing financial crisis and the adoption of a new 
bank resolution regulation have significantly 
increased the demand for a better risk disclosure in 
banking. 
The aim of this research is to compare 
derivative disclosure among four large European 
banks, ranked by market capitalization. The 
derivative transparency ratio and the credit 
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derivative transparency ratio of the four banks 
provide empirical evidence that derivative disclosure 
could be improved in the Annual statements and 
Pillar 3 Reports. There is still room for improvement 
in the explanations of the use of derivatives and 
hedging strategies. The conclusion to be drawn from 
the research is that the examined banks provide 
derivative disclosure variously. We expect that the 
risk disclosure in banking will increase after the 
introduction of the recent new version of the Pillar 3 
disclosure requirements and the new IFRS 9.  
It is important to mention some crucial aspects 
of this empirical research. The paper is based only 
on the 2015 annual reports of four large European 
banks. Further investigations could extend the 
period of analysis and the sample of larger banks in 
Europe. The content analysis we propose in this 
paper is based on an objective evaluation of risk 
disclosure by reading the annual bank reports. The 
scoring model uses a binary scheme to evaluate each 
key disclosure parameter. This is the main 
restriction of the methodology. On the contrary, this 
purely objective method attenuates the subjectivity 
that affects the content analysis. More risk 
disclosure parameters could be taken into account 
within a more granular scoring model to improve the 
quality of the methodology. Further research could 
overcome these limitations.  
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